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Abstract
Nonmonotonic causal logic, introduced by Norman McCain and Hudson Turner, became
a basis for the semantics of several expressive action languages. McCain’s embedding of
definite propositional causal theories into logic programming paved the way to the use of
answer set solvers for answering queries about actions described in such languages. In this
paper we extend this embedding to nondefinite theories and to first-order causal logic.
KEYWORDS: reasoning about actions, nonmonotonic causal logic, answer set program-
ming
1 Introduction
Propositional nonmonotonic causal logic (McCain and Turner 1997) and its gener-
alizations became a basis for the semantics of several expressive action languages
(Giunchiglia and Lifschitz 1998; Giunchiglia et al. 2004; Lifschitz and Ren 2006;
Lifschitz and Ren 2007; Ren 2009). The Causal Calculator (CCalc)1 is a partial
1 http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/ccalc/
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implementation of this logic that allows us to automate some kinds of reasoning
and planning in action domains described in such languages. It has been used to
solve several challenging commonsense reasoning problems, including problems of
nontrivial size (Akman et al. 2004), to provide a group of robots with high-level
reasoning (Caldiran et al. 2009), to give executable specifications of norm-governed
computational societies (Artikis et al. 2009), and to automate the analysis of busi-
ness processes under authorization constraints (Armando et al. 2009).
An important theorem due to Norman McCain (McCain 1997, Proposition 6.7)
shows how to embed a fragment of propositional causal logic into the language of
logic programming under the answer set semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991).
This result, reviewed below, paved the way to the development of an attractive
alternative to CCalc—the software system coala (Gebser et al. 2010) that uses
answer set programming (Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1999; Niemela¨ 1999; Lifschitz
2008) for answering queries about actions described in causal logic.
A causal theory in the sense of (McCain and Turner 1997) is a set of “causal
rules” of the form F ⇐ G, where F and G are propositional formulas (the head
and the body of the rule). The rule reads “F is caused if G is true.” Distinguishing
between being true and having a cause turned out to be essential for the study of
commonsense reasoning. The assertion “if the light is on at time 0 and you toggle
the switch then the light will be off at time 1” can be written as an implication:
on0 ∧ toggle → ¬on1·
In causal logic, on the other hand, we can express that under the same assumption
there is a cause for the light to be off at time 1:
¬on1 ⇐ on0 ∧ toggle·
(Performing the toggle action is the cause.) McCain and Turner showed that dis-
tinctions like this help us solve the frame problem (see Example 5 in Section 5.2)
and overcome other difficulties arising in the theory of reasoning about actions.
The semantics of theories of this kind defines when a propositional interpreta-
tion (truth assignment) is a model of the given theory (is “causally explained” by
the theory, in the terminology of McCain and Turner). We do not reproduce the
definition here, because a more general semantics is described below in Section 3.
But here is an example: the causal theory
p ⇐ ¬q
¬q ⇐ p
(1)
has one model, according to the semantics from (McCain and Turner 1997). In this
model, p is true and q is false. (Since the bodies of both rules are true in this model,
both rules “fire”; consequently the heads of the rules are “caused”; consequently
the truth values of both atoms are “causally explained.” This will be discussed
formally in Section 3.)
McCain’s translation is applicable to a propositional causal theory T if the head
of each rule of T is a literal, and the body is a conjunction of literals:
L ⇐ A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧ ¬Am+1 ∧ · · · ¬An · (2)
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The corresponding logic program consists of the logic programming rules
L ← not ¬A1, . . . ,not ¬Am , not Am+1, . . . ,not An (3)
for all rules (2) of T . This program involves two kinds of negation: negation as
failure (not) and strong, or classical, negation (¬). According to Proposition 6.7
from (McCain 1997), complete answer sets of this logic program are identical to
the models of T . (A set of literals is complete if it contains exactly one member
of each complementary pair of literals A,¬A. We identify a complete set of literals
with the corresponding truth assignment.)
For instance, McCain’s translation turns causal theory (1) into
p ← not q
¬q ← not ¬p·
(4)
The only answer set of this program is {p,¬q}. It is complete, and it corresponds
to the model of causal theory (1).
In this paper we generalize McCain’s translation in several ways. First, we discard
the requirement that the bodies of the given causal rules be conjunctions of literals.
Second, instead of requiring that the head of each causal rule be a literal, we
allow the heads to be disjunctions of literals. In this more general setting, the logic
program corresponding to the given causal theory becomes disjunctive as well.
Third, we study causal rules with heads of the form L1 ↔ L2, where L1 and
L2 are literals. Such a rule says that there is a cause for L1 and L2 to be equiv-
alent (“synonymous”) under some condition, expressed by the body of the rule.
Synonymity rules play an important role in the theory of commonsense reasoning
in view of the fact that humans often explain the meaning of words by referring to
their synonyms. A synonymity rule
L1 ↔ L2 ⇐ G (5)
can be translated into logic programming by rewriting it as the pair of rules
L1 ∨ L2 ⇐ G
L1 ∨ L2 ⇐ G
(L stands for the literal complementary to L) and then using our extension of
McCain’s translation to rules with disjunctive heads. It turns out, however, that
there is no need to use disjunctive logic programs in the case of synonymity rules.
If, for instance, G in (5) is a literal then the following group of nondisjunctive rules
will do:
L1 ← L2, not G
L2 ← L1, not G
L1 ← L2, not G
L2 ← L1, not G ·
Finally, we extend the translation from propositional causal rules to first-order
causal rules in the sense of (Lifschitz 1997). This version of causal logic is useful for
defining the semantics of variables in action descriptions (Lifschitz and Ren 2007).
As part of motivation for our approach to transforming causal theories into logic
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programs, we start with a few additional comments on McCain’s translation (Sec-
tion 2). After reviewing the semantics of causal theories and logic programs in
Sections 3 and 4, we describe four kinds of causal rules that we are interested in
and show how to turn a theory consisting of such rules into a logic program (Sec-
tion 5). This translation is related to answer set programming in Section 6, and its
soundness is proved in Section 7.
Preliminary reports on this work are published in (Ferraris 2006; Ferraris 2007;
Lee et al. 2010; Lifschitz and Yang 2010). Some results appear here for the first time,
including the soundness of a representation of a synonymity rule with variables by
a nondisjunctive logic program.
2 McCain’s Translation Revisited
2.1 Incorporating Constraints
In causal logic, a constraint is a rule with the head ⊥ (falsity). McCain’s translation
can be easily extended to constraints with a conjunction of literals in the body—
causal rules of the form
⊥ ⇐ A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧ ¬Am+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬An · (6)
In the language of logic programming, (6) can be represented by a rule similar
to (3):
⊥ ← not ¬A1, . . . ,not ¬Am , not Am+1, . . . ,not An · (7)
Furthermore, each of the combinations not ¬ in (7) can be dropped without de-
stroying the validity of the translation; that is to say, the rule
⊥ ← A1, . . . ,Am , not Am+1, . . . ,not An (8)
can be used instead of (7).
2.2 Eliminating Strong Negation
As observed in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991), strong negation can be eliminated from
a logic program in favor of additional atoms. Denote the new atom representing a
negative literal ¬A by Â. Then (3) will become
A0 ← not Â1, . . . ,not Âm , not Am+1, . . . ,not An (9)
if L is a positive literal A0, and
Â0 ← not Â1, . . . ,not Âm , not Am+1, . . . ,not An (10)
if L is a negative literal ¬A0. The modified McCain translation of a causal theory T
consisting of rules of the forms (2) and (6) includes
• rules (8) corresponding to the constraints (6) of T ,
• rules (9), (10) corresponding to the other rules of T , and
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• the completeness constraints
← A, Â
← not A,not Â
(11)
for all atoms A.
For instance, the modified McCain translation of (1) is
p ← not q
q̂ ← not p̂
← p, p̂
← not p, not p̂
← q, q̂
← not q, not q̂ ·
(12)
The only answer set (stable model2) of this program is {p, q̂}.
This modification is useful to us in view of the fact that eliminating strong
negation in favor of aditional atoms is part of the definition of a stable model
proposed in (Ferraris et al. 2011, Section 8).
2.3 Rules as Formulas
The definition of a stable model for propositional formulas given in (Ferraris 2005)
and the definition of a stable model for first-order sentences proposed in (Ferraris
et al. 2011) become generalizations of the original definition (Gelfond and Lifschitz
1988) when we rewrite rules as logical formulas. For instance, rules (9) and (10),
rewritten as propositional formulas, become
¬Â1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Âm ∧ ¬Am+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬An → A0 (13)
and
¬Â1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Âm ∧ ¬Am+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬An → Â0· (14)
Rule (8) can be identified with the formula
A1 ∧ · · · ∧Am ∧ ¬Am+1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬An → ⊥ (15)
or, alternatively, with
¬(A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧ ¬Am+1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬An)· (16)
The completeness constraints for an atom A turn into the formulas
¬(A ∧ Â)
¬(¬A ∧ ¬Â)·
(17)
2 The term “stable model” was introduced in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) to describe the meaning
of logic programs with negation as failure but without strong negation. When the stable model
semantics was extended to programs with strong negation in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991), the
term “answer set” was proposed as a replacement.
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Here is program (12) rewritten in the syntax of propositional logic:
¬q → p
¬p̂ → q̂
¬(p ∧ p̂)
¬(¬p ∧ ¬p̂)
¬(q ∧ q̂)
¬(¬q ∧ ¬q̂)·
(18)
Note that the process of rewriting a rule as a formula is applicable only when
the rule does not contain strong negation; the symbol ¬ in the resulting formula
corresponds to the negation as failure symbol (not) in the rule.
One of the advantages of writing rules as formulas is that it allows us to relate
properties of stable models to subsystems of classical logic. We know, for instance,
that if the equivalence of two sentences can be proved in intuitionistic logic (or even
in the stronger logic of here-and-there) then these sentences have the same stable
models (Ferraris et al. 2011, Theorem 5). This fact will be used here many times.
2.4 Translating Arbitrary Definite Theories
The requirement, in the definition of McCain’s translation, that the bodies of all
causal rules should be conjunctions of literals can be lifted by slightly modifying
the translation process. Take any set T of causal rules of the forms
A ⇐ G, (19)
¬A ⇐ G, (20)
⊥ ⇐ G, (21)
where A is an atom and G is an arbitrary propositional formula (rules of these
forms are called definite). For each rule (19), take the formula ¬¬G → A; for
each rule (20), the formula ¬¬G → Â; for each rule (21), the formula ¬G. Then
add completeness constraints (17) for all atoms A. Answer sets of this collection of
propositional formulas correspond to the models of T .
In application to example (1), this modification of McCain’s translation gives
¬¬¬q → p
¬¬p → q̂
¬(p ∧ p̂)
¬(¬p ∧ ¬p̂)
¬(q ∧ q̂)
¬(¬q ∧ ¬q̂)·
(22)
It is not surprising that (22) has the same answer set as (18): the two collections
of formulas are intuitionistically equivalent to each other.3
3 Indeed, ¬¬¬q is intuitionistically equivalent to ¬q ; the equivalence between ¬¬p and ¬p̂ is
intuitionistically entailed by the formulas ¬(p ∧ p̂) and ¬(¬p ∧ ¬p̂), which belong both to (18)
and to (22).
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3 Review: First-Order Causal Theories
According to (Lifschitz 1997), a first-order causal theory T is defined by
• a list p of distinct predicate constants,4 called the explainable symbols of T ,5
and
• a finite set of causal rules of the form F ⇐ G, where F and G are first-order
formulas.
The semantics of first-order causal theories can be described as follows. For each
p ∈ p, choose a new predicate variable υp of the same arity, and let υp stand for
the list of all these variables. By T †(υp) we denote the conjunction of the formulas
∀x(G → Fp
υp
) (23)
for all rules F ⇐ G of T , where x is the list of all free variables of F , G. (The expres-
sion Fp
υp
denotes the result of substituting the variables υp for the corresponding
constants p in F .)
We view T as shorthand for the sentence
∀υp(T †(υp) ↔ (υp = p))· (24)
(By υp = p we denote the conjunction of the formulas ∀x(υp(x) ↔ p(x)) for all
p ∈ p, where x is a tuple of distinct object variables.) Accordingly, by a model
of T we understand a model of (24) in the sense of classical logic. The models of T
are characterized, informally speaking, by the fact that the interpretation of the
explainable symbols p in the model is the only interpretation of these symbols that
is “causally explained” by the rules of T .
In the definite case (see Section 2.4) second-order formula (24) can be replaced
by an equivalent first-order formula using a process similar to Clark’s completion
(Clark 1978), called literal completion (McCain and Turner 1997), (Lifschitz 1997,
Section 5). This process is used in the operation of CCalc.
Example 1. Let T be causal theory (1) with both p and q explainable. Then
T †(υp, υq) is
(¬q → υp) ∧ (p → ¬υq)
(υp, υq are propositional variables), so that T is understood as shorthand for the
second-order propositional formula (“QBF”)
∀(υp)(υq)((¬q → υp) ∧ (p → ¬υq) ↔ (υp ↔ p) ∧ (υq ↔ q))· (25)
This formula is equivalent to p ∧ ¬q.6
4 We view propositional symbols as predicate constants of arity 0, so that they are allowed in p.
Equality, on the other hand, may not be declared explainable.
5 To be precise, the definition in (Lifschitz 1997) is more general: object and function constants
can be treated as explainable as well.
6 This fact can be verified by replacing the universal quantifier in (25) with the conjunction of
the four propositional formulas obtained by substituting all possible combinations of values for
the variables υp, υq , and simplifying the result. Alternatively, one can apply literal completion
to rules (1) and simplify the result.
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Example 2. Let T be the causal theory consisting of two rules:
p(a) ⇐ 
(here  is the logical constant true) and
¬p(x ) ⇐ ¬p(x ),
with the explainable symbol p. The first rule says that there is a cause for a to have
property p. The second rule says that if an object does not have property p then
there is a cause for that; including this rule in a causal theory has, informally speak-
ing, the same effect as saying that p is false by default (Lifschitz 1997, Section 3).
In this case, T †(υp) is
υp(a) ∧ ∀x (¬p(x ) → ¬υp(x )),
so that T is understood as shorthand for the sentence
∀υp(υp(a) ∧ ∀x (¬p(x ) → ¬υp(x )) ↔ ∀x (υp(x ) ↔ p(x )))·
This sentence is equivalent to the first-order formula
∀x (p(x ) ↔ x = a), (26)
as can be verified by applying literal completion to the rules of T .
4 Review: Stable Models
Some details of the definition of a stable model proposed in (Ferraris et al. 2011)
depend on which propositional connectives are treated as primitives, and which are
viewed as abbreviations. The convention there is to take the 0-place connective ⊥
and the binary connectives ∧, ∨, → as primitives; ¬F is shorthand for F → ⊥.
In this paper we adopt the view that first-order formulas are formed using a
slightly larger set of propositional connectives:
, ⊥, ¬, ∧, ∨, →
(as well as the quantifiers ∀, ∃). On the other hand, stable models are only defined
here for sentences of a special syntactic form. A first-order sentence is a rule7 if it
has the form ∀˜(F → G) and has no occurrences of → other than the one explicitly
shown.8 If a sentence F does not contain implication then we will identify it with
the rule  → F . For instance, propositional formulas (13)–(18) are rules. A logic
program is a conjunction of rules. The definition of a stable model below is more
limited than the definition from (Ferraris et al. 2011) because it is only applicable
to programs, not to arbitrary sentences. For instance, it does not cover the formulas
(p → q) → r and (p → q) ∨ r . On the other hand, it is simpler than the general
definition, and it is sufficient for our present purposes.
7 Or program rule, to distinguish it from causal rules in the sense of Section 3.
8 ∀˜F stands for the universal closure of F .
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We need the following notation from (Lifschitz 1994). If p and q are predicate
constants of the same arity then p ≤ q stands for the formula
∀x(p(x) → q(x)),
where x is a tuple of distinct object variables. If p and q are tuples p1, . . . , pn and
q1, . . . , qn of predicate constants then p ≤ q stands for the conjunction
(p1 ≤ q1) ∧ · · · ∧ (pn ≤ qn),
and p < q stands for (p ≤ q)∧¬(q ≤ p). In second-order logic, we apply the same
notation to tuples of predicate variables.
Let p be a list of distinct predicate constants; members of p will be called in-
tensional predicates.9 For each p ∈ p, choose a predicate variable υp of the same
arity, and let υp stand for the list of all these variables. For any logic program F ,
by SMp[F ] we denote the second-order sentence
F ∧ ¬∃υp((υp < p) ∧ F (υp)), (27)
where F (υp) is the formula obtained from F by replacing, for every p ∈ p, each
occurrence of p that is not in the scope of negation with υp. A model of F is stable
(relative to the set p of intensional predicates) if it satisfies SMp[F ].
10
Example 3. Let F be the propositional formula ¬p → q (the one-rule program
q ← not p, in traditional notation). If both p and q are intensional then F (υp, υq)
is
¬p → υq,
so that SMpq [F ] is
(¬p → q) ∧ ¬∃(υp)(υq)(((υp, υq) < (p, q)) ∧ (¬p → υq))·
This formula is equivalent to ¬p ∧ q.11 Consequently F has one stable model: p is
false and q is true.
Example 4. Let F be the formula
∀x (¬p(x ) → (q(x ) ∨ ¬q(x ))) (28)
(it can be thought of as a formula representation of the lparse choice rule
9 This list usually consists of all predicate symbols occurring in the heads of rules; those are the
predicates that we “intend to characterize” by the rules of the program. The original definition
of a stable model (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) treats all predicates as intensional.
10 We can make two comments about the relation of this treatment of stable models to earlier work.
First, if we drop from the definition of SM the words “that is not in the scope of negation” then
it will turn into the definition of parallel circumscription (McCarthy 1986; Lifschitz 1985). It
follows that if a logic program does not contain negation then the class of its stable models is
identical to the class of its minimal models. The stipulation in the description of F(υp) that
intensional predicates in the scope of negation are not replaced by variables is a reflection of
the idea of negation as failure. Second, the operator of SM as defined in (Ferraris et al. 2011)
produces, in application to a logic program, a second-order formula that is usually more complex
than (27) but is equivalent to it.
11 Methods for simplifying the result of applying the operator SM are discussed in (Ferraris et al.
2011).
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{q(X)} :- not p(X)).12 If we take q to be the only intensional predicate then F (υq)
is
∀x (¬p(x ) → (υq(x ) ∨ ¬q(x )))·
Consequently SMq [F ] is
∀x (¬p(x ) → (q(x ) ∨ ¬q(x ))) ∧ ¬∃υq((υq < q) ∧ ∀x (¬p(x ) → (υq(x ) ∨ ¬q(x ))))·
The first conjunctive term here is logically valid and can be dropped. The second is
equivalent to the first-order formula ¬∃x (p(x ) ∧ q(x )), which reflects the intuitive
meaning of the choice rule above: q is an arbitrary set disjoint from p.
The relationship between the definition of a stable model given above and the
operation of answer set solvers is discussed in Section 6.
If programs F and G are intuitionistically equivalent then SMp[F ] is equival-
ent to SMp[G], that is to say, F and G have the same stable models. Moreover,
for establishing that F and G have the same stable models we only need to de-
rive F ↔ G intuitionistically from the excluded middle formulas ∀˜(H ∨ ¬H ) for
some formulas H that do not contain intensional predicates. This fact follows from
(Ferraris et al. 2011, Theorem 5).
5 Turning a Causal Theory into a Logic Program
5.1 Four Types of Causal Rules
In the rest of the paper, we assume that the bodies of causal rules do not contain
implication. This is not an essential limitation, because in classical logic → can be
expressed in terms of other connectives, and the meaning of a causal rule does not
change if we replace its body (or head) by a classically equivalent formula.
Here are four types of rules that we are going to consider, in the order of increasing
complexity of their heads:
• The head is ⊥, that is, the rule is a constraint. Such causal rules will be also
called C-rules.
• The head is a literal containing an explainable predicate symbol. These are
L-rules.
• The head has the form L1 ↔ L2, where each Li is a literal containing an
explainable predicate symbol. These are synonymity rules, or S-rules.
• The head has the form L1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ln (n ≥ 0), where each Li is a literal
containing an explainable predicate symbol. These are D-rules.
All C-rules and L-rules can be viewed also as D-rules, and any S-rule can be
replaced with an equivalent pair of D-rules (see Lemma 11 in Section 7.2). Nev-
ertheless, we give special attention here to rules of the first three types, and the
reason is that our translation handles such rules in special ways. It appears that
12 This rule would not be accepted by lparse, however, because it is “nonrestricted.” For a descrip-
tion of the language of lparse see http://www.tcs.hut.fi/Software/ smodels/lparse.ps.
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causal rules of types C, L, and S will be more important than general D-rules in
applications of this work to the automation of reasoning about actions.
On the other hand, the possibility of reducing types C, L, and S to type D plays
an important role in the proof of the soundness of our translation (Section 7). This
is one of the reasons why we are interested in general D-rules.
The requirement, in the definitions of types L, S and D, that the literals in the
head of the rule contain explainable predicate symbols is not an essential limitation.
If, for instance, the predicate symbol in the head of L ⇐ G is not explainable then
this rule can be equivalently replaced by the C-rule ⊥ ⇐ G ∧ L. If a rule has the
form
L1 ↔ L2 ⇐ G
and the predicate symbol in L1 is not explainable then the rule can be replaced by
L2 ⇐ G ∧ L1,
L2 ⇐ G ∧ L1·
If a rule has the form
L1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ln ⇐ G
and the predicate symbol in L1 is not explainable then the rule can be replaced by
L2 ∨ · · · ∨ Ln ⇐ G ∧ L1·
5.2 Translating C-Rules and L-Rules
The transformation described in this section generalizes McCain’s translation, in
the form described in Section 2.4, to first-order causal theories.
The operator Trc , which transforms any C-rule into a program rule, is defined
by the formula
Trc [⊥ ⇐ G] = ∀˜¬G·
The operator Trl , which transforms any L-rule into a program rule, is defined by
the formulas
Trl [p(t) ⇐ G] = ∀˜(¬¬G → p(t)),
Trl [¬p(t) ⇐ G] = ∀˜(¬¬G → p̂(t))
(t is a tuple of terms).
If T is a causal theory consisting of C-rules and L-rules then its translation Tr[T ]
is the logic program obtained by conjoining
• the rules obtained by applying Trc to the C-rules of T ,
• the rules obtained by applying Trl to the L-rules of T , and
• the completeness constraints
∀x¬(p(x) ∧ p̂(x)),
∀x¬(¬p(x) ∧ ¬p̂(x))
(29)
(x is a tuple of distinct object variables) for all explainable predicate symbols p
of T .
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Let p be the list of explainable predicate symbols p of T , and let p̂ be the list
of the corresponding predicate symbols p̂. Take the union of p and p̂ to be the set
of intensional predicates. Then the stable models of the logic program Tr[T ] are
“almost identical” to the models of T ; the difference is due to the fact that the
language of T does not contain the symbols p̂. Let CC be the conjunction of all
completeness constraints (29). Then the relationship between T and Tr[T ] can be
described as follows:
SMpp̂[Tr[T ]] is equivalent to T ∧CC · (30)
This claim, expressing the soundness of our translation, is extended in Sections 5.3
and 5.4 to causal theories containing S-rules and D-rules, and its proof is given in
Section 7.
Since the conjunction of formulas (29) is classically equivalent to
∀x(p̂(x) ↔ ¬p(x)), (31)
sentence CC can be viewed as the conjunction of explicit definitions of the pred-
icates p̂ in terms of the predicates p. Consequently the relationship (30) shows
that SMpp̂[Tr[T ]] is a definitional extension of T . The models of Tr[T ] that are
stable relative to pp̂ can be characterized as the models of T extended by the
interpretations of the predicates p̂ that are provided by definitions (31).
Example 1, continued. If T is causal theory (1) with both p and q explainable
then Tr[T ] is the conjunction of formulas (22). The result of applying the operator
SMpqp̂q̂ to this conjunction is equivalent to
p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬p̂ ∧ q̂·
Recall that T is equivalent to the first half of this conjunction (Section 3). The
second half tells us that the truth values of p̂, q̂ are opposite to the truth values
of p, q. In the only stable model of (22), p and q̂ are true, and p̂ and q are false; if
we “forget” the truth values of p̂ and q̂ then we will arrive at the model of (1).
Example 2, continued. Our translation turns the causal theory from Example 2
into the conjunction of the rules
¬¬ → p(a),
∀x (¬¬¬p(x ) → p̂(x )),
∀x¬(p(x ) ∧ p̂(x )),
∀x¬(¬p(x ) ∧ ¬p̂(x )),
or, after intuitionistically equivalent transformations,
p(a),
∀x (¬p(x ) → p̂(x )),
∀x¬(p(x ) ∧ p̂(x )),
∀x¬(¬p(x ) ∧ ¬p̂(x ))·
The result of applying SMpp̂ to the conjunction of these formulas is equivalent to
the conjunction of (26) with the formula ∀x (p̂(x ) ↔ ¬p(x )), which says that p̂ is
the complement of p.
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Example 5. Consider the following causal rules:
on1(x ) ⇐ toggle(x ) ∧ ¬on0(x ),
¬on1(x ) ⇐ toggle(x ) ∧ on0(x ),
on1(x ) ⇐ on0(x ) ∧ on1(x ),
¬on1(x ) ⇐ ¬on0(x ) ∧ ¬on1(x )·
(32)
The first pair of rules describes the effect of toggling a switch x : this action causes
the fluent on(x ) at time 1 to take the value opposite to its value at time 0. The
second pair solves the frame problem (Shanahan 1997) for the fluent on(x ) by
postulating that if the value of that fluent at time 1 is equal to its previous value
then there is a cause for this. (Inertia, in the sense of commonsense reasoning, is
the cause.) Let T be the causal theory with rules (32) and with on1 as the only
explainable symbol. Using literal completion, we can check that T is equivalent to
∀x (on1(x ) ↔ ((on0(x ) ∧ ¬toggle(x )) ∨ (¬on0(x ) ∧ toggle(x ))))· (33)
Our translation turns T into the conjunction of the rules
∀x (¬¬(toggle(x ) ∧ ¬on0(x )) → on1(x )),
∀x (¬¬(toggle(x ) ∧ on0(x )) → ôn1(x )),
∀x (¬¬(on0(x ) ∧ on1(x )) → on1(x )),
∀x (¬¬(¬on0(x ) ∧ ¬on1(x )) → ôn1(x )),
∀x¬(on1(x ) ∧ ôn1(x )),
∀x¬(¬on1(x ) ∧ ¬ôn1(x )),
(34)
or, equivalently,13
∀x (toggle(x ) ∧ ¬on0(x ) → on1(x )),
∀x (toggle(x ) ∧ on0(x ) → ôn1(x )),
∀x (on0(x ) ∧ ¬ôn1(x ) → on1(x )),
∀x (¬on0(x ) ∧ ¬on1(x ) → ôn1(x )),
∀x¬(on1(x ) ∧ ôn1(x )),
∀x¬(¬on1(x ) ∧ ¬ôn1(x ))·
(35)
The result of applying SMon1ôn1 to this program is equivalent to the conjunction
of (33) with the formula ∀x (ôn1(x ) ↔ ¬on1(x )), which says that ôn1 is the com-
plement of on1.
Example 6. The constraint
⊥ ⇐ toggle(badswitch)
expresses that badswitch is stuck: the action of toggling it is not executable. If we
add this constraint to the causal theory from Example 5 then the rule
¬toggle(badswitch)
13 Removing the double negations in the first two lines of (34) is possible because neither toggle nor
on0 is intensional (see the comment on equivalent transformations of logic programs at the end
of Section 4). In a similar way, the antecedent of the third impication in (34) can be replaced
by on0(x) ∧ ¬¬on1(x); the equivalence between ¬¬on1(x) and ¬ôn1(x) is intuitionistically
entailed by the last two lines of (34). The fourth line of (34) is simplified in a similar way.
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will be added to its translation (35).
The bodies of causal rules in Examples 5 and 6 are syntactically simple: they
are conjunctions of literals. The general definitions of a C-rule and an L-rule do
not impose any restrictions on the form of the body, and in applications of causal
logic to formalizing commonsense knowledge this generality is often essential. For
instance, the statement “each position must have at least one neighbor” in the
landscape structure of the Zoo World14 would be represented in causal logic by a
C-rule with a quantifier in the body.
5.3 Translating S-Rules
We will turn now to translating synonymity rules (Section 5.1). The operator Trs ,
transforming any such rule into a logic program, is defined by the formulas
Trs [p1(t
1) ↔ p2(t2) ⇐ G] = Trs [¬p1(t1) ↔ ¬p2(t2) ⇐ G]
= ∀˜(¬¬G ∧ p1(t1) → p2(t2)) ∧ ∀˜(¬¬G ∧ p2(t2) → p1(t1))∧
∀˜(¬¬G ∧ p̂1(t1) → p̂2(t2)) ∧ ∀˜(¬¬G ∧ p̂2(t2) → p̂1(t1)),
Trs [¬p1(t1) ↔ p2(t2) ⇐ G] = Trs [p1(t1) ↔ ¬p2(t2) ⇐ G]
= ∀˜(¬¬G ∧ p̂1(t1) → p2(t2)) ∧ ∀˜(¬¬G ∧ p2(t2) → p̂1(t1))∧
∀˜(¬¬G ∧ p1(t1) → p̂2(t2)) ∧ ∀˜(¬¬G ∧ p̂2(t2) → p1(t1))
(t1, t2 are tuples of terms). The definition of program Tr[T ] from Section 5.2 is
extended to causal theories that may contain S-rules, besides C-rules and L-rules,
by adding that Tr[T ] includes also
• the rules obtained by applying Trs to the S-rules of T .
Example 7. Extend the theory from Example 5 by the rule
dark ↔ ¬on1(myswitch) ⇐ , (36)
where dark is explainable. The corresponding logic program is obtained from (35)
by adding the rules
d̂ark → on1(myswitch),
on1(myswitch) → d̂ark ,
dark → ôn1(myswitch),
ôn1(myswitch) → dark ,
¬(dark ∧ d̂ark ),
¬(¬dark ∧ ¬d̂ark )·
(37)
We will see that the soundness property (30) holds for arbitary causal theories
consisting of rules of types C, L, and S.
14 The challenge of formalizing the Zoo World was proposed as part of the Logic Modelling Work-
shop (http:/www/ida.liu.se/ext/etai/lmw/). The possibility of addressing this challenge using
CCalc is discussed in (Akman et al. 2004, Section 4).
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5.4 Translating D-Rules
A D-rule (Section 5.1) has the form
∨
A∈Pos
A ∨
∨
A∈Neg
¬A ⇐ G (38)
for some sets Pos, Neg of atomic formulas.
If A is an atomic formula p(t), where p ∈ p and t is a tuple of terms, then by Â
we will denote the formula p̂(t). The operator Trd transforms D-rule (38) into the
program rule
∀˜
⎛
⎝¬¬G ∧ ∧
A∈Pos
(Â ∨ ¬Â) ∧
∧
A∈Neg
(A ∨ ¬A) →
∨
A∈Pos
A ∨
∨
A∈Neg
Â
⎞
⎠ · (39)
Example 8. The result of applying Trd to the D-rule
p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r ⇐ s
is
¬¬s ∧ (p̂ ∨ ¬p̂) ∧ (q ∨ ¬q) ∧ (r ∨ ¬r) → p ∨ q̂ ∨ r̂ ·
The number of “excluded middle formulas” conjoined with ¬¬G in (39) equals
the number of disjunctive terms in the head of D-rule (38). In particular, if (38) is
an L-rule then the antecedent of (39) contains one such formula. For instance, in
application to the first rule of (1) Trd produces the program rule
¬¬¬q ∧ (p̂ ∨ ¬p̂) → p,
which is more complex than the first rule of (22).
For a fixed collection p of explainable symbols, let C , L, S , and D be finite sets
of causal rules of types C, L, S, and D respectively. By Tr[C ,L, S ,D ] we denote the
logic program obtained by conjoining
• the rules obtained by applying Trc to all rules from C ,
• the rules obtained by applying Trl to all rules from L,
• the programs obtained by applying Trs to all rules from S ,
• the rules obtained by applying Trd to all rules from D ,
• the completeness constraints (29) for all explainable symbols p.
Our most general form of the soundness theorem, proved in Section 7, asserts that
SMpp̂[Tr[C ,L, S ,D ]] is equivalent to T ∧ CC (40)
for the causal theory T with the set of rules C∪L∪S∪D . In the special case when D
is empty this theorem turns into the assertion stated at the end of Section 5.3.
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6 Using Answer Set Solvers to Generate Models of a Causal Theory
The discussion of answer set solvers in this section, as almost any discussion of
software, is somewhat informal. We assume here that the first-order language under
consideration does not contain function constants of nonzero arity.
An answer set solver can be viewed as a system for generating stable models in
the sense of Section 4, with three caveats. First, currently available solvers require
that the input program have a syntactic form that is much more restrictive than
the syntax of first-order logic.15 Preprocessing based on intuitionistically equivalent
transformations often helps us alleviate this difficulty. There exists a tool, called
f2lp (Lee and Palla 2009), that converts first-order formulas of a rather general
kind into logic programs accepted by lparse. The rules produced by the process
described in the previous section have no existential quantifiers in their heads, and
all quantifiers in their bodies are in the scope of negation. Consequently, these
rules satisfy a syntactic condition that guarantees the correctness of the translation
implemented in f2lp.
Second, answer set solvers represent stable models by sets of ground atoms. To
introduce such a representation, we usually choose a finite set of object constants
that includes all object constants occurring in the program, and restrict attention
to Herbrand interpretations of the extended language. The #domain construct of
lparse16 can be used to specify the object constants constituting the domain of
the variables in the program.
Third, most existing answer set solvers are unaware of the possibility of non-
intensional (or extensional) predicates. Treating a predicate constant as extensional
can be simulated using a choice rule (Ferraris et al. 2011, Theorem 2). There is also
another approach to overcoming this limitation. Take a conjunction E of some
ground atoms containing extensional predicates, and assume that we are interested
in the Herbrand stable models of a program F that interpret the extensional pred-
icates in accordance with E (every atom from E is true; all other atoms containing
extensional predicates are false). Under some syntactic conditions,17 these stable
models are identical to the Herbrand stable models of F ∧ E with all predicate
constants treated as intensional. This can be proved using the splitting theorem
from (Ferraris et al. 2009).
Example 4, continued. We would like to find the stable models of (28), with q
intensional, that have the universe {a, b, c, d} and make p true on a, b and false
on c, d . This is the same as to look for the Herbrand stable models of the formula
∀x (¬p(x ) → (q(x ) ∨ ¬q(x ))) ∧ p(a) ∧ p(b),
with c and d viewed as object constants of the language along with a and b, and
with both p and q taken to be intensional.
15 They also require that the input satisfy some safety conditions. See, for instance, Chapter 3 of
the dlv manual, http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/man/.
16 See Footnote (12).
17 Specifically, under the assumption that every occurrence of every extensional predicate in F is
in the scope of negation or in the antecedent of an implication.
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u(a;b;c;d).
#domain u(X).
{q(X)} :- not p(X).
p(a;b).
Fig. 1. Example 4 with a 4-element universe in the language of lparse
A representation of this example in the language of lparse is shown in Figure 1.
The auxiliary predicate u describes the universe of the interpretations that we are
interested in. The first line is shorthand for
u(a). u(b). u(c). u(d).
and the last line is understood by lparse in a similar way.
Given this input, the answer set solver smodels generates 4 stable models, rep-
resenting the subsets of {a, b, c, d} that are disjoint from {a, b}:
Answer: 1
Stable Model: p(b) p(a) u(d) u(c) u(b) u(a)
Answer: 2
Stable Model: p(b) p(a) q(d) u(d) u(c) u(b) u(a)
Answer: 3
Stable Model: p(b) p(a) q(c) u(d) u(c) u(b) u(a)
Answer: 4
Stable Model: p(b) p(a) q(d) q(c) u(d) u(c) u(b) u(a)
In application to the logic program obtained from a causal theory T as described
in Section 5, this process often allows us to find the models of T with a given
universe and given extents of extensional predicates.
Example 7, continued. There are two switches, myswitch and hisswitch . It is
dark in my room at time 1 if and only if myswitch is not on at time 1. At time 0,
both switches are on; then hisswitch is toggled, and myswitch is not. Is it dark
in my room at time 1? We would like to answer this question using answer set
programming.
This example of commonsense reasoning involves inertia (the value of the fluent
on(myswitch) does not change because this fluent is not affected by the action that
is executed) and indirect effects of actions: whether or not it is dark in the room
at time 1 after performing some actions is determined by the effect of these actions
on the fluent on(myswitch).
Mathematically, we are talking here about the causal theory T with rules (32)
and (36), with the object constant hisswitch added to the language, and with the
explainable symbols on1 and dark . We are interested in the Herbrand models of T
in which the extents of the extensional predicates are described by the atoms
on0(myswitch), on0(hisswitch), toggle(hisswitch)·
As we have seen, the logic program Tr[T ] is equivalent to the conjunction of
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u(myswitch;hisswitch).
#domain u(X).
on1(X) :- toggle(X), not on0(X).
-on1(X) :- toggle(X), on0(X).
on1(X) :- on0(X), not -on1(X).
-on1(X) :- not on0(X), not on1(X).
:- not on1(X), not -on1(X).
on1(myswitch) :- -dark.
-dark :- on1(myswitch).
-on1(myswitch) :- dark.
dark :- -on1(myswitch).
:- not dark, not -dark.
on0(myswitch;hisswitch).
toggle(hisswitch).
Fig. 2. Example 7 with two switches in the language of lparse
rules (35) and (37). The corresponding lparse input file is shown in Figure 2. In
this file, the “true negation” symbol - is used in the ASCII representations of the
symbols ôn1 and d̂ark ; the lparse counterparts of the rules
∀x¬(on1(x ) ∧ ôn1(x )),
¬(dark ∧ d̂ark )
are dropped, because such “coherence” conditions are verified by the system auto-
matically.
Given this input, smodels generates the only model of T satisfying the given
conditions:
Answer: 1
Stable Model: -on1(hisswitch) on1(myswitch) -dark toggle(hisswitch)
on0(hisswitch) on0(myswitch) u(hisswitch) u(myswitch)
The presence of -dark in this model tells us that it is not dark in the room at
time 1.
The example above is an example of “one-step temporal projection”—predicting
the value of a fluent after performing a single action in a given state. Some other
kinds of temporal reasoning and planning can be performed by generating models of
simple modifications of the given causal theory (Giunchiglia et al. 2004, Section 3.3);
this is one of the ideas behind the design of CCalc and coala. McCain’s transla-
tion reviewed in the introduction and its generalization presented in Section 5 allow
us to solve such problems automatically using an answer set solver.
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7 Proof of Soundness
To prove claim (40), which expresses the soundness of our translation, we will first
establish it for the case when C = L = S = ∅ (Section 7.1). In this “leading special
case” all rules of the given causal theory are D-rules, and they are converted to
program rules using the translation Trd . Then we will derive the soundness theorem
in full generality (Section 7.2).
7.1 Leading Special Case
Let T be a finite set of causal rules of the form (38). Let Π be the conjunction of the
corresponding program rules (39), and let CC , as before, stand for the conjunction
of the completeness constraints (29) for all explainable symbols p of T . We want
to show that
SMpp̂[Π ∧ CC ] is equivalent to T ∧ CC · (41)
The key steps in the proof below are Lemma 5 (one half of the equivalence) and
Lemma 8 (the other half).
In the statement of the following lemma, ¬p stands for the list of predicate
expressions18 λx¬p(x), where x is a list of distinct object variables, for all p from p.
By υp, υp̂ we denote the lists of predicate variables used in the second-order formula
SMpp̂[Π ∧ CC ] (see Section 4).
Lemma 1
Formula (υp, υp̂) < (p,¬p) is equivalent to∨
p∈p
(((υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p)) ∧ ∃x(¬υp(x) ∧ ¬υp̂(x)))·
Proof
Note first that
(υp, υp̂) < (p,¬p)
⇔ ((υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p)) ∧ ¬ ((p,¬p) ≤ (υp, υp̂))
⇔ ((υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p)) ∧
∨
p∈p ∃x((p(x) ∧ ¬υp(x)) ∨ (¬p(x) ∧ ¬υp̂(x)))
⇔
∨
p∈p(((υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p)) ∧ ∃x((p(x) ∧ ¬υp(x)) ∨ (¬p(x) ∧ ¬υp̂(x))))·
The disjunction after ∃x is equivalent to
(p(x) ∨ ¬υp̂(x)) ∧ (¬υp(x) ∨ ¬p(x)) ∧ (¬υp(x) ∨ ¬υp̂(x))· (42)
Since (υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p) entails
υp(x) → p(x) and υp̂(x) → ¬p(x),
the first conjunctive term of (42) can be rewritten as ¬υp̂(x), and the second term
as ¬υp(x), so that (42) will turn into ¬υp(x) ∧ ¬υp̂(x).
18 See (Lifschitz 1994, Section 3.1).
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For any formula F , by FΣ1 we denote the formula
F
(υp)(υp̂)
(υp∧p)(¬υp∧¬p)
where υp ∧ p is understood as the list of predicate expressions
λx(υp(x) ∧ p(x))
for all p ∈ p, and ¬υp ∧ ¬p is understood in a similar way.19
Lemma 2
Formula
((υp, υp̂) < (p,¬p))Σ1
is equivalent to υp = p.
Proof
In view of Lemma 1, ((υp, υp̂) < (p,¬p))Σ1 is equivalent to the disjunction of the
formulas(∧
p∈p ∀x(υp(x) → p(x))Σ1
)
∧
(∧
p∈p ∀x(υp̂(x) → ¬p(x))Σ1
)
∧ ∃x(¬υp(x) ∧ ¬υp̂(x))Σ1
(43)
for all p ∈ p. It is easy to verify that
(υp(x) → p(x))Σ1 = (υp(x) ∧ p(x) → p(x)) ⇔  ,
(υp̂(x) → ¬p(x))Σ1 = (¬υp(x) ∧ ¬p(x) → ¬p(x)) ⇔ ,
(¬υp(x) ∧ ¬υp̂(x))Σ1 ⇔ ((¬υp(x) ∨ ¬p(x)) ∧ ¬(¬υp(x) ∧ ¬p(x)))
⇔ (υp(x) ↔ ¬p(x))
⇔ ¬(υp(x) ↔ p(x))·
Therefore (43) is equivalent to ∃x¬(υp(x) ↔ p(x)), so that the disjunction of all
formulas (43) is equivalent to υp = p.
If A is an atomic formula p(t), where p ∈ p and t is a tuple of terms, then we
will write υA for υp(t), and Â for υp̂(t). By ∀˜objF we denote the formula ∀xF ,
where x is list of all free object variables of F (“object-level universal closure”).
Define H (υp, υp̂) to be the conjunction of the implications
∀˜obj
⎛
⎝G → ∨
A∈Pos
((υÂ ∨ A) → υA) ∨
∨
A∈Neg
((υA ∨ ¬A) → υÂ)
⎞
⎠ (44)
for all rules (38) in T .
Lemma 3
Formula SMpp̂[Π ∧ CC ] is equivalent to
Π ∧ CC ∧ ∀(υp)(υp̂)(((υp, υp̂) < (p,¬p)) → ¬H (υp, υp̂))· (45)
19 For the definition of F
p
υp see Section 3.
Representing First-Order Causal Theories by Logic Programs 21
Proof
Every occurrence of every intensional predicate in CC is in the scope of a negation.
Consequently SMpp̂[Π ∧ CC ] is
Π ∧ CC ∧ ¬∃(υp)(υp̂)(((υp, υp̂) < (p, p̂)) ∧Π(υp, υp̂) ∧ CC ),
which is equivalent to
Π ∧ CC ∧ ∀(υp)(υp̂)(((υp, υp̂) < (p,¬p)) → ¬Π(υp, υp̂))·
We will conclude the proof by showing that CC entails
Π(υp, υp̂) ↔ H (υp, υp̂)·
The left-hand side of this equivalence is the conjunction of the formulas
∀˜obj
⎛
⎝¬¬G ∧ ∧
A∈Pos
(υÂ ∨ ¬Â) ∧
∧
A∈Neg
(υA ∨ ¬A) →
∨
A∈Pos
υA ∨
∨
A∈Neg
υÂ
⎞
⎠
for all rules (38) in T . Under the assumption CC this formula can be rewritten as
∀˜obj
⎛
⎝G → ∨
A∈Pos
¬(υÂ ∨A) ∨
∨
A∈Neg
¬(υA ∨ ¬A) ∨
∨
A∈Pos
υA ∨
∨
A∈Neg
υÂ
⎞
⎠ ·
The last formula is equivalent to
∀˜obj
⎛
⎝G → ∨
A∈Pos
(¬(υÂ ∨ A) ∨ υA) ∨
∨
A∈Neg
(¬(υA ∨ ¬A) ∨ υÂ)
⎞
⎠ ·
and consequently to (44).
Lemma 4
T †(υp) is equivalent to H (υp, υp̂)Σ1.
Proof
Formula T †(υp) is the conjunction of the formulas
∀˜obj
⎛
⎝G → ∨
A∈Pos
υA ∨
∨
A∈Neg
¬υA
⎞
⎠ (46)
for all rules (38) in T . On the other hand, H (υp, υp̂)Σ1 is the conjunction of the
formulas
∀˜obj
⎛
⎝G → ∨
A∈Pos
((υÂ ∨ A) → υA)Σ1 ∨
∨
A∈Neg
((υA ∨ ¬A) → υÂ)Σ1
⎞
⎠ (47)
for all rules (38) in T . It remains to observe that
((υÂ ∨ A) → υA)Σ1 = (¬υA ∧ ¬A) ∨ A → υA ∧A
⇔ ¬υA ∨ A → υA ∧ A
⇔ (υA ∧ ¬A) ∨ (υA ∧ A)
⇔ υA,
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and that, similarly, ((υA ∨ ¬A) → υÂ)Σ1 is equivalent to ¬υA.
Lemma 5
SMpp̂[Π ∧ CC ] |= T ∧ CC .
Proof
Recall that, according to Lemma 3, SMpp̂[Π∧CC ] is equivalent to (45). The second
conjunctive term of (45) is CC . The first conjunctive term is equivalent to T †(p).
From the other two terms we conclude:
∀υp(((υp, υp̂) < (p, p̂))Σ1 → ¬H (υp, υp̂)Σ1)·
By Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, this formula is equivalent to
∀υp((υp = p) → ¬T †(υp)),
and consequently to
∀υp(T †(υp) → (υp = p))·
The conjunction of the last formula with T †(p) is equivalent to (24).
For any formula F , by FΣ2 we denote the formula
Fυp(((υp,υp̂)≤(p,¬p))∧¬υp∧¬υp̂)↔¬p
where the subscript
(((υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p)) ∧ ¬υp ∧ ¬υp̂) ↔ ¬p
is understood as the list of predicate expressions
λx((((υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p)) ∧ ¬υp(x) ∧ ¬υp̂(x)) ↔ ¬p(x))
for all p ∈ p.
Lemma 6
Formula
(υp = p)Σ2
is equivalent to (υp, υp̂) < (p,¬p).
Proof
Formula (υp = p)Σ2 is equivalent to∨
p∈p
∃x(υp(x) ↔ ¬p(x))Σ2
that is,∨
p∈p
∃x((((υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p)) ∧ ¬υp(x) ∧ ¬υp̂(x) ↔ ¬p(x)) ↔ ¬p(x))·
This formula can be equivalently rewritten as∨
p∈p
(((υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p)) ∧ ∃x(¬υp(x) ∧ ¬υp̂(x))),
which is equivalent to (υp, υp̂) < (p,¬p) by Lemma 1.
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Lemma 7
The implication
(υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p) → (T †(υp)Σ2 ↔ H (υp, υp̂))
is logically valid.
Proof
Recall that T †(υp) is the conjunction of implications (46) for all rules (38) in T .
Consequently T †(υp)Σ2 is the conjunction of the formulas
∀˜obj
⎛
⎝G → ∨
A∈Pos
(υA)Σ2 ∨
∨
A∈Neg
¬(υA)Σ2
⎞
⎠ ,
that is to say,
∀˜obj (G →
∨
A∈Pos((((υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p)) ∧ ¬υA ∧ ¬υÂ) ↔ ¬A)∨∨
A∈Neg ¬((((υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p)) ∧ ¬υA ∧ ¬υÂ) ↔ ¬A)·
Under the assumption
(υp, υp̂) ≤ (p,¬p) (48)
the last formula can be equivalently rewritten as
∀˜obj
⎛
⎝G → ∨
A∈Pos
((υA ∨ υÂ) ↔ A) ∨
∨
A∈Neg
((υA ∨ υÂ) ↔ ¬A)
⎞
⎠ ·
It remains to check that, under assumption (48),
(υA ∨ υÂ) ↔ A (49)
can be equivalently rewritten as
υÂ ∨ A → υA, (50)
and
υA ∨ υÂ ↔ ¬A (51)
can be rewritten as
υA ∨ ¬A → υÂ· (52)
Formula (49) is equivalent to
(υA → A) ∧ (υÂ → A) ∧ (A → υA ∨ υÂ)· (53)
Since assumption (48) entails υA → A and υÂ → ¬A, formula (53) can be rewritten
as
¬υÂ ∧ (A → υA)· (54)
On the other hand, formula (50) is equivalent to
(υÂ → υA) ∧ (A → υA),
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which, under assumption (48), can be rewritten as (54) as well. In a similar way,
each of the formulas (51), (52) can be transformed into
¬υA ∧ (¬A → υÂ) ·
Lemma 8
T ∧CC |= SMpp̂[Π ∧ CC ].
Proof
Recall that T is equivalent to
T †(p) ∧ ∀υp(T †(υp) → (υp = p))· (55)
Since the first conjunctive term is equivalent to Π, T ∧ CC entails
Π ∧ CC · (56)
From the second conjunctive term of (55) we conclude
T †(υp)Σ2 → (υp = p)Σ2
and consequently
∀(υp)(υp̂)((υp = p)Σ2 → ¬T
†(υp)Σ2)·
By Lemma 6, this is equivalent to
∀(υp)(υp̂)(((υp, υp̂) < (p,¬p)) → ¬T †(υp)Σ2)
and, by Lemma 7, to
∀(υp)(υp̂)(((υp, υp̂) < (p,¬p)) → ¬H (υp, υp̂))·
By Lemma 3, the conjunction of this formula with (56) is equivalent to sentence
SMpp̂[Π ∧ CC ].
Assertion (41) follows from Lemmas 5 and 8.
7.2 General Case
Lemma 9
For any C-rule R, Trc [R] is intuitionistically equivalent to Trd [R].
Proof
If R is ⊥ ⇐ G then Trc [R] is ∀˜¬G, and Trd [R] is ∀˜(¬¬G → ⊥).
Lemma 10
For any L-rule R, the conjunction CC of completeness constraints intuitionistically
entails
Trl [R] ↔ Trd [R]·
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Proof
If R is p(t) ⇐ G then Trl [R] is
∀˜(¬¬G → p(t)),
and Trd [R] is
∀˜(¬¬G ∧ (p̂(t) ∨ ¬p̂(t)) → p(t))·
Since CC intuitionistically entails
¬(p(t) ↔ p̂(t)), (57)
it is sufficient to check that p(t) can be derived from (57) and
p̂(t) ∨ ¬p̂(t) → p(t) (58)
by the deductive means of intuitionistic propositional logic. Since (58) is equivalent
to p(t) in classical propositional logic, it is easy to see that ¬p̂(t) can be derived
from (57) and (58) in classical propositional logic. By Glivenko’s theorem,20 it fol-
lows that it can be derived intuitionistically as well. Since p(t) is intuitionistically
derivable from (58) and ¬p̂(t), we can conclude that p(t) is intuitionistically deriv-
able from (57) and (58).
The case when R is ¬p(t) ⇐ G is similar.
Lemma 11
If R is an S-rule
L1 ↔ L2 ⇐ G (59)
and R1, R2 are the D-rules
L1 ∨ L2 ⇐ G and L1 ∨ L2 ⇐ G (60)
then the conjunction CC of completeness constraints intuitionistically entails
Trs [R] ↔ Trd [R1] ∧Trd [R2]·
Proof
If each of the literals Li is an atom Ai then Trs [R] is the conjunction of the formulas
∀˜(¬¬G ∧A1 → A2),
∀˜(¬¬G ∧A2 → A1),
∀˜(¬¬G ∧ Â1 → Â2),
∀˜(¬¬G ∧ Â2 → Â1),
(61)
Trd [R1] is
∀˜(¬¬G ∧ (Â1 ∨ ¬Â1) ∧ (A2 ∨ ¬A2) → A1 ∨ Â2), (62)
20 This theorem (Glivenko 1929), (Mints 2000, Theorem 3.1) asserts that if a formula beginning
with negation can be derived from a set Γ of formulas in classical propositional logic then it can
be derived from Γ in intuitionistic propositional logic as well.
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and Trd [R2] is
∀˜(¬¬G ∧ (A1 ∨ ¬A1) ∧ (Â2 ∨ ¬Â2) → Â1 ∨ A2)· (63)
We need to show that CC intuitionistically entails the equivalence between the
conjunction of formulas (61) and the conjunction of formulas (62), (63). Since CC
intuitionistically entails
¬(A1 ↔ Â1) (64)
and
¬(A2 ↔ Â2), (65)
it is sufficient to check that the conjunction of formulas (64), (65),
A1 ↔ A2 (66)
and
Â1 ↔ Â2 (67)
is equivalent in intuitionistic propositional logic to the conjunction of formulas (64), (65),
(Â1 ∨ ¬Â1) ∧ (A2 ∨ ¬A2) → A1 ∨ Â2 (68)
and
(A1 ∨ ¬A1) ∧ (Â2 ∨ ¬Â2) → Â1 ∨ A2· (69)
Left-to-right: Assume (64)–(67) and
(Â1 ∨ ¬Â1) ∧ (A2 ∨ ¬A2); (70)
our goal is to derive intuitionistically A1 ∨ Â2. Consider two cases, in accordance
with the first disjunction in (70). Case 1: Â1. Then, by (67), Â2, and consequently
A1∨Â2. Case 2: ¬Â1. Consider two cases, in accordance with the second disjunction
in (70). Case 2.1: A2. Then, by (66), A1, and consequently A1∨ Â2. Case 2.2: ¬A2.
Then, by (66), ¬A1, which contradicts (64).
Thus we proved that (68) is intuitionistically derivable from (64)–(67). The proof
for (69) is similar.
Right-to-left: Let Γ be the set consisting of formulas (64), (65), (68), (69) and A1.
We claim that A2 can be derived from Γ in intuitionistic propositional logic. Note
that, classically,
• Formula (64) is equivalent to A1 ↔ ¬Â1,
• Formula (65) is equivalent to A2 ↔ ¬Â2, and
• Formula (69) is equivalent to Â1 ∨ A2.
It follows that ¬Â2 is derivable from Γ in classical propositional logic. By Glivenko’s
theorem, it follows that ¬Â2 is derivable from Γ intuitionistically as well. Hence the
antecedent of (69) is an intuitionistic consequence of Γ, and so is the consequent
Â1 ∨ A2. In combination with A1 and (64), this gives us A2.
We conclude that A1 → A2 is intuitionsistically derivable from (64), (65), (68)
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and (69). The derivability of the implication A2 → A1 from these formulas can be
proved in a similar way. Thus (66) is an intuitionistic consequence of (64), (65),
(68), and (69).
The derivability of (67) from these formulas in propositional intuitionistic logic
is proved in a similar way.
The cases when the literals Li are negative, or when one of them is positive and
the other is negative, are similar.
Proof of the soundness property (40). Let C , L, S , and D be sets of causal rules of
types C, L, S, and D respectively, and let T be the causal theory with the set of
rules C ∪ L ∪ S ∪D . Consider the causal theory T ′ obtained from T by replacing
each rule (59) from S with the corresponding rules (60). According to the result (41)
of Section 7.1,
SMpp̂[Π ∧ CC ] is equivalent to T
′ ∧ CC ,
where Π is the conjunction of the program rules Trd [R] for all rules R of T
′. It is
clear that Π ∧ CC is Tr[T ′], and that T ′ is equivalent to T . Consequently
SMpp̂[Tr[T
′]] is equivalent to T ∧CC · (71)
On the other hand, Lemmas 9, 10 and 11 show that the formulas Tr[T ′] and
Tr[C ,L, S ,D ] are intuitionistically equivalent to each other, because each of them
contains CC as a conjunctive term. It follows that
SMpp̂[Tr[T
′]] is equivalent to SMpp̂[Tr[C ,L, S ,D ]]· (72)
Assertion (40) follows from (71) and (72).
8 Conclusion
In this paper we generalized McCain’s embedding of definite causal theories into
logic programming. We expect that this work will provide a theoretical basis for
extending the system coala to more expressive action languages, including the
modular action language MAD (Ren 2009). It is essential, from this perspective,
that our translation is applicable to synonymity rules, because such rules are closely
related to the main new feature of MAD, its import construct.
Our translation is not applicable to causal rules with quantifiers in the head. It
may be possible to extend it to positive occurrences of existential quantifiers, since
an existentially quantified formula can be thought of as an infinite disjunction.
But the translation would be a formula with positive occurrences of existential
quantifiers as well, and it is not clear how to turn such a formula into executable
code.
In the future, we would like to extend the translation described above to causal
theories with explainable function symbols, which correspond to non-Boolean flu-
ents in action languages. Since the definition of a stable model does not allow
function symbols to be intensional, such a generalization would have to involve
extending the language by auxiliary predicate symbols.
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